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Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being
aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents)
including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and
control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-
centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology
and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences
has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive
architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive
functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out
competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient
non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience
of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive
explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a
cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling
1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the
mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for
building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency
of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose
that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of
being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware,
and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared
by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious
and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In
arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific
approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of
their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain
processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.
Keywords: consciousness, subjective awareness, cognitive neuroscience, epiphenomenon, non-conscious
processing
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“Epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive, but the alternatives are
more than counterintuitive” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 160).
INTRODUCTION
For something so obviously real and undeniable, ‘consciousness’
was a late subject of formal psychological enquiry. This was
due in large part to the compelling, common sense notion
that as subjects we already know what ‘consciousness’ is, by
simply experiencing it. As such the function of consciousness is
typically taken as self-evident in folk, philosophical and much
of the psychological and neuroscience literature. Consequenctly
for many scholars who drew the essential difference between
first-person (subjective experience) and third person (scientific)
accounts, the apparent challenge is to achieve an integrated
explanatory framework that linked the intuitive subjective
conscious experience with the rest of the natural sciences.
Another challenge for all researchers interested in providing
an explanation for consciousness lies in is the realization that
as a “mongrel concept” (Block, 1995) and “a word worn smooth
by a million tongues” (Miller, 1962) there are many theories of
consciousness, but none that are widely accepted.
While “the term means many different things to many different
people’, [with] no universally agreed “core meaning” (Velmans,
2009). . . “everyday experience furnishes the strong impression that
conscious thoughts such as decisions, plans, and intentions play an
important role in causing behavior” (Baumeister et al., 2018).
Velmans suggest that some of the “wide-ranging disparities [in
theories of consciousness] arise more from pre-existing theoretical
commitments (beliefs about the nature of consciousness, mind and
world) than from the everyday phenomenology of ‘consciousness
itself,” although he assumes that the latter informs and shapes
the former:
“From a first-person perspective, consciousness appears to exert
a central influence on human affairs, and scientists have a first-
person perspective as much as their subjects. It is not surprising,
therefore, that consciousness has been thought to enter into every
major phase of information processing, ranging from the analysis,
selection and storage of input to the organization, planning, and
execution of response. . . ..[as such] . . . viewed from a first-person
perspective, consciousness is central to the determination of human
action.” (p32/34, Velmans, 1991).
To help resolve some of the confusion arising from this “ill-
defined concept,” the philosopher Block (1995) suggested
a conceptual distinction between two interacting types of
consciousness: phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness)
and access consciousness (A-consciousness). Phenomenal
consciousness is the first person, immediate and non-reflective,
experience of sensations, which describes feelings, perceptions,
thoughts, wants and emotions, inaccessible to an external
observer – and not requiring further justification.
Access consciousness, however, is characterized by
reportable, representational content and involves the ability
to self-monitor and engage cognitive functions such as reasoning
and movements for direct control of action and speech.
Building on these views, traditional notions of
“consciousness” comprise at least 3 related features
(i) the experience of subjective awareness (a component
of P-consciousness)
(ii) awareness of self together with the perceived volitional
capacity to make decisions and control actions (a component
of P-consciousness).
(iii) the awareness of psychological states such as thoughts,
attention, perception, intentions, memories, emotions -
(A-consciousness -sometimes described as the “contents
of consciousness”).
With regard to the A-consciousness, Baars and McGovern (1996;
p. 91–92) suggest that “consciousness” covers a range of cognitive
functions including:
• Defining a stimulus and removing ambiguities in perception
and understanding.
• Adaptative and Learning functions.
• Prioritizing and Access control functions when seeking high
level goals
• Recruitment and Control of mental and physical actions.
• Decision-making and Executive functions.
• Error-detection and Editing functions.
• Reflective and Self-monitoring functions.
• Optimizing the trade-off between organization and flexibility.
The intuitive, first person experience affords an easy and
unquestioned attribution for many of the core cognitive
functions including agency, body ownership and social
responsibility. This promotes the wider concept of a personalized
“free will” and unified self which in turn provides for the
socially prevalent acceptance of libertarian, religious and
democratic views. According to Pierson and Triut (2017) the
ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional
movement possible, and all conscious processes exist to serve
this ultimate function.
In the late 19th century, the reliance on introspection
provided the early pioneers of psychology with the first
systematic examination of conscious experience and an intuitive
explanation. Citing the lack of scientific reliability, behaviorists
later discarded this line of enquiry for nearly half a century.
Recovered by cognitive psychologists in the 1960s using
computational analogies, the main focus of the new-wave
psychology, lay however, less in elucidating consciousness
per se, than in charting the hidden information processing
structures located in modular systems with “most psychologists”
recognizing “that they do not know what consciousness is” [Miller,
1962 p. 27.]
Even by the 1970s and 1980s, when cognitive science become
more established and confident, consciousness remained amuch-
neglected topic (Sohn, 2019), because the “dominant assumption
of cognitive psychology in the 1970s was that the higher
mental processes were almost entirely under conscious executive
control” (Bargh, 2019) with some authors speculating that it
was necessary for high level processes such as choice, learning
and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses,
particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity
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FIGURE 1 | Schacter’s Dissociable Interactions and Conscious Experience
(DICE) model form (Block, 1995).
(Velmans, 1991). According to Kotchoubey (2018), most
contemporary theories of consciousness consider consciousness
to be a kind of executive information processing (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Dennett, 1991; Damasio, 1999; Edelman and Tononi,
2000; Koch, 2004; Maia and Cleeremans, 2005) without spelling
out the detailed cognitive architecture of the executive system.
One explicit account that claimed an executive role for
consciousness is Schacter’s Dissociable Interactions and
Conscious Experience (DICE) model (1990). This account
proposed that “the processes that mediate conscious identification
and recognition – that is, phenomenal awareness in different
domains — should be sharply distinguished from modular
systems that operate on linguistic, perceptual, and other kinds of
information” (p. 160–161, 1990).
Similar to Shallice’s Supervisory System (Shallice, 1988)
account, Schachter’s DICE model suggests that the primary
role of consciousness as shown in Figure 1 is to mediate
voluntary action under the control of a central executive. In
this model, Schacter (1990) provides consciousness with a
key information processing role responsible for integrating the
outputs of specialized modules and transmitting the resulting
signals to the executive system.
The belief that consciousness comprises a number of high-
level cognitive, agentive controlled functions is found implicitly
in most contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience
accounts together with a qualitative split between conscious
(intentional/within subjective awareness) and non-conscious
processes (unintended/and outside awareness) (Dennett, 1991;
Damasio, 1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Koch, 2004;
Maia and Cleeremans, 2005). This widely accepted dichotomy
formalized within psychological theories has been described in
terms of controlled vs. automatic cognitive processes (Norman
and Shallice, 1986), slow vs. fast thinking (Kahneman, 2011),
with the second process being the province of the “cognitive
unconscious” (Kihlstrom, 1987).
The widespread acceptance of the binary difference helped
motivate the growth in psychological and neuropsychology
studies interested in discovering the underlying “impaired”
(hidden) “non-conscious” psychological architecture. In this and
previous articles, we draw no distinction between the terms
unconscious and non-conscious.
CHALLENGING THE PRIMACY OF THE
CONSCIOUS-CENTRIC ACCOUNT
Bargh notes that “until quite recently in the history of science
and philosophy, mental life was considered entirely or mainly
conscious in nature (e.g., Descartes’ cogito and John Locke’s “mind
first” cosmology). The primacy of conscious thought for how people
historically have thought about the mind is illustrated today
in the words we use to describe other kinds of processes—all
are modifications or qualifications of the word conscious (i.e.,
unconscious, preconscious, subconscious, non-conscious” (Bargh
and Morsella, 2008 p. 73).
In Halligan and Oakley (2000), we argued that this traditional
conscious-centric account, although experienced as real, is
from a science perspective wrong headed and that a more
detailed consideration everyday phenomenological experience
and evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggested that
however compelling first person experience, consciousness has
no explicit causal function and that this functional attribution
relies on a powerful intuitive false belief, albeit one we are all
strongly adapted to maintain. Why is this?
According to Graziano et al. (2019), our brain systematically
misleads us into thinking that consciousness has non-physical,
experiential, properties by constructing an inaccurate form
of self-description, based on the brain’s internal models for
monitoring attention (Graziano, 2013; Webb and Graziano,
2015).
In 2017 (Oakley and Halligan, 2017), we presented a
detailed account arguing that non-conscious neural causation
provided a more plausible (albeit non-intuitive) basis to explain
both the “experience of consciousness” and the “contents of
consciousness.” We consider that subjective awareness provided
no functional or causal impact upon psychological outputs or
actions other than appearing contemporaneously with those
psychological events as experienced.
Like others (e.g., Searle, 2000), we consider “consciousness,”
to be a first-person experience generated in a similar way to other
physiological process like respiration, circulation, and immune
functions and where the contents of subjective awareness
(thoughts, memories, perception, and action) are the result
of selective neuro-cognitive processes, just as “digestion” is a
product of selective and co-ordinated gastrointestinal processes.
Central to the different accounts of consciousness are
attempts to reconcile the first person (private) and third
person perspectives. However, these perspectives do not
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appear to comfortably inhabit the same explanatory domains.
Implicit acceptance of the first person, private conscious-centric
perspective continues to dominate attempts to develope a 3rd
person scientific account with the resulting adherence to a
compelling belief in agentive consciousness.
Although not surprising, everyday introspection suggests that
the subjective nature of first-person awareness is not that of a
qualitative experience constructed or controlled by us, but rather
of a qualitative experience that is provided effortlessly, and which
we have limited or little perceived control.
Consider how effortlessly we regain consciousness each
morning after losing it the night before; how our thoughts,
ideas and emotions arrive already preformed; how colors and
shapes are constructed into meaningful objects or memorable
faces without any deliberate effort until we become aware of them
as meaningful objects.
As Velmans (2002) points out: “One is not conscious of one’s own
brain/body processing. So how could there be conscious control of
such processing? How “conscious” is conscious, voluntary control?
. . . One might be aware of the fact that relaxing imagery can lower
heart rate, but one has no awareness of how it does so, nor, in
biofeedback, does one have any awareness of how consciousness
might control the firing of a single motor neurone. One isn’t even
conscious of how to control the articulatory system in everyday
“conscious speech!” Speech production is one of the most complex
tasks humans are able to perform. Yet, one has no awareness
whatsoever of the motor commands issued from the central nervous
system that travel down efferent fibers to innervate the muscles,
nor of the complex motor programming that enables muscular co-
ordination and control. In speech, for example, the tongue may
make as many as 12 adjustments of shape per second - adjustments
which need to be precisely coordinated with other rapid, dynamic
changes within the articulatory system. According to Lenneberg
(1967), within 1min of discourse as many as 10 to 15 thousand
neuromuscular events occur. Yet only the results of this activity (the
overt speech) normally enters consciousness” (p. 6).
“We usually remain unaware of many of our own actions. One
reason is that, even when an action is consciously executed, its
memory trace is of a very short duration, and so rapidly forgotten.
It is indeed a common experience when leaving home to ask oneself
“Did I lock the door?” or “Did I turn off the light?” immediately
after doing it. One may also drive home and suddenly realize that
one has arrived there without having the least idea how one did it.”
(Jeannerod, 2006, p. 25).
As all cognitive functions attributed to consciousness must derive
from underlying neural “machinery” that give raise to them in the
brain, we argue that to avoid the endless vacillation between 1st
and 3rd person perspectives, when explaining human psychology
from a scientific perspective, we suggest that subjective awareness
(consciousness) possesses no cognitive function (i.e., has no
functional utility) separate from the brain, any more than there is
a specific category of “digestive” process that exists separate from
the physicality and workings of the gut.
Despite this, most of us feel compelled to believe that when we
make a voluntary action, we do not feel as though it has simply
happened, but rather instead “feel” as though we are responsible
for the action (Moore, 2016).
As such, our account can be seen to support Ryle’s (1949)
critique of the concept of a “ghost in the machine” as some form of
qualitative, distinctive interveningmysterious state separate from
the neural machinery and comprising cognitive representations
providing for agentive and control processes. Thoughts and
behavior are caused by brain activity – but being by-products of
the neural activity have no causal efficacy for our behavior or on
the activity of the brain itself.
Rather than being conceived as a mysterious immaterial
“ghost” in the neural machinery, the reality, we suggest, is that we
have subjective experiences (consciousness) generated by brain
systems associated with feelings of agency and control. Having
such feelings alone does not prove that subjective awareness
directs or controls our psychological processes and outputs.
We see the brain as the ultimate and proximal computational
information processing apparatus, that effortlessly generates
our psychological contents and creates self-representations
(including the familiar sense of “self ”), our body image, as well
as providing an ongoing personal narrative.
Accordingly, while accepting that one can draw a qualitative
distinction between P and A consciousness, we hold that neither
engage any cognitive executive functions per se. As such, the
traditional parsing of psychological states in terms of the
presence or absence of consciousness is a relative distinction as
both are carried out by underlying brain systems. Perpetuating
this distinction serves to constrain the scientific understanding
of psychological processes by excluding the reality that non-
conscious brain processes are responsible for all psychological
processes including conscious awareness itself.
Given the indisputable physiological and pathological
evidence for a causal dependency between subjective awareness
and brain functioning, a central quest of modern neuroscience
has been to identity & locate the neural correlates of subjective
awareness (Crick and Koch, 1990; Koch et al., 2016). Underlying
this search are at least 3 assumptions that:
(i) subjective awareness is not generated by some mysterious
immaterial substance
(ii) subjective awareness is causally generated and dependent on
neural processes
(iii) subjective awareness does not causally generate or control
psychological processes or outputs
Accepting these assumptions, questions the belief implicit in
most folk and scientific accounts of consciousness that links
subjective awareness with proximal agentive causal functions.
In this paper, we present a brief description of an
alternative model of cognitive processing which does not
rely on consciousness as an intervening cognitive process.
We then outline some consequences where the utility of the
non-conscious neurocognitive processes take primacy when
providing a scientific account where most neurocognitive
changes are not reflected in subjective awareness.
We also consider the expanding role of the “cognitive
unconscious,” and, related to that, the justification for an
epiphenomenalist position regarding the nature of subjective
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awareness – which in effect involves removing the ghost from the
operations of the neuro-cognitive machinery.
THE OAKLEY-HALLIGAN MODEL
While accepting the reality of a subjective awareness, the Oakley
and Halligan model (2017) is not intended to explain how
or where neural processes produce consciousness, but rather
to challange the common attribution of cognitive functions to
consciousness and to offer an alternative framework in keeping
with findings from cognitive neuroscience and introspection.
Based on experience from a range of psychological (Oakley,
1985) and neuropsychological phenomena including striking
dissociations betweenwhat patients report verbally andwhat they
can respond to behaviourally (e.g., visual neglect, anosognosia)
(LeDoux et al., 2020), hypnosis (Oakley and Halligan, 2009,
2013), suggestion (Halligan and Oakley, 2014), placebo (Kirsh,
2019), and conditions such as amnesia (Milner, 1967), blindsight,
(Weiskrantz, 1997), visual neglect (Marshall and Halligan, 1988;
Halligan and Marshall, 1991), hysteria (Halligan, 2011), and
phantom limbs (Halligan, 2002), we concluded that psychological
content experienced in subjective awareness is generated by and
within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous
self-referential “personal narrative.”
Wegner (2002) presents a compelling series of cases where
people feel they are willing an act when they are not, such as
in phantom limbs and ear wiggling, or when they feel they are
not willing an act or experience when they are in fact initiating,
such as auditory hallucinations, automatic writing, the Chevreul
pendulum effect, dowsing, ideomotor actions – particularily in
the context of hypnosis, which can produce the feeling that “your
actions are happening to you rather than that you are doing them”
(Lynn et al., 1990).
We propose that this continuously updated narrative arises
from the “internal broadcasting” of selective outputs of cognitive
processing, sensory information, and motor control. The
personal narrative that “we” as individuals are familiar with
forms the basis for autobiographical memories, but critically
also serves the powerful evolutionary function that enables
us to communicate the content of our internal broadcasting,
all of which allows recipients to generate potentially mutually
adaptive strategies.
We argue that it is the capacity to communicate the contents
of these personal narrative either as knowledge or beliefs to other
minds, and not personal awareness per se that confers individual
evolutionary advantage. This transmission and sharing of
internal narratives (external broadcasting) via language and other
means has the potential to create a cultural reservoir of ideas and
information accessible to the broader group as a shared resource.
Importantly, both personal awareness and the personal narrative
themselves are seen as passive non-agentive consequences of
neurocognitive processing. Externally broadcast contents of the
personal narrative, however, can serve an agentive function in
initiating change in others in a social/cultural context.
This conceptual reframing of subjective awareness as a
passive accompaniment to neurocognitive processes, offers a
FIGURE 2 | Abbreviated version of the Oakley-Halligan model of cognitive
psychological function. For the full version see Oakley and Halligan (2017). The
Central Executive structure creates and orchestrates all the cognitive
psychological processes carried out by the brain. The solid arrows at the top
of the model represent the process of Internal Broadcasting that underlies the
creation of an ongoing Personal Narrative (PN). The dotted arrows represent
the process of External Broadcasting whereby selected contents of the
personal narrative can be communicated particularly, but not solely, via
language, to other individuals facilitating social collaboration and the creation
of a cultural store of ideas, skills, and information. Personal Awareness (PA) is
an epiphenomenal subjective experience that passively accompanies the
contents of the personal narrative. Also shown is the linkage between contents
of the PN and autobiographical memory.
reset and focus for elucidating the cognitive architecture when
exploring the origin and function of psychological processes,
previously attributed in large or small part to the presence of
an elusive executive “consciousness.” A simple schematic model
of proposed cognitive psychological processing in the brain
is shown in Figure 2 (See Oakley and Halligan, 2017, for a
fuller account).
In brief, the core Central Executive Structure (CES)
is a functional collection of neurological systems used to
coordinate and select psychological products from different brain
systems mediating attention, perception, memory, reasoning,
Language, problem solving, planning, theory of mind, and
the search for meaning. The psychological products of these
neural systems include thoughts, beliefs, ideas, percept’s,
sensations, speech, memories, feelings, intentions. actions,
reflexes, and habits.
The operative assumption here is that psychological states
taxonomized by appeal to their psychological properties are
identical with neural states and processes, and that these
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 571460
Halligan and Oakley Giving Up the Ghost of Consciousness
non-conscious states (being outputs of underlying neural
processes) have utility in shaping the psychological contents and
actions that make it into subjective awareness.
The CES is responsible for creating the continuously updated
personal narrative (PN) from components of brain activity
considered most relevant for an ongoing task. The process
of creating the personal narrative we describe as “internal
broadcasting.” The personal narrative is accompanied passively
by subjective experience – personal awareness (PA).
Within this model PA, unlike the non-conscious
neuropsychological processes, is epiphenomenal and its
neural origins remain to be determined by further scientific
research into comparable neuro-cognitive processing systems.
Accordingly, PA is not able to influence the brain process
associated with it. An important feature of CES activity it
that it also able to select some contents from the personal
narrative for transmission to other individuals primarily by
speech in humans but also via writing, gestures and other
non-verbal media. This second transmission process we
refer to as “external broadcasting.” This facilitates social
collaboration and the creation of a cultural store of ideas,
skills and information - see Oakley and Halligan (2017) for
further details.
In common with Graziano’s account (2017) we envisage
that the brain generates a range of higher-level representational
schemata, identified in our case as the CES, capable of exerting
control over lower level schemas as well as more basic level
functions, but not dependent upon personal awareness. We don’t
assume an over-arching schema that controls other schemata –
though we assume this is the way the brain is represented via
internal broadcasting of cognitive processes into the PN. Even if
this was the case, then paradoxically, in traditional terminology it
would have to be categorized as non-conscious consciousness.
An understandable objection to the phenomenological
account is that as human beings we have developed extensive
social and legal governance structures that explicitly assume a
conscious-centric account that actively promotes and accepts
the case for individual responsibility, mental causation and self-
directed actions. To substantiate the belief in “free will” (the
power or capacity of a “self ” to choose among alternatives and to
act in situations independently of biological or social restraints)
one could argue that one needs to hold with the belief that
humans have conscious centric mediated systems designed for
self-directed “voluntary” abilities. In other words, the concept
of consciousness is needed to express the delusion of free will
(Meese, 2018).
An epiphenomenalist could argue (Bacrac, 2010) however,
that the subjective experience or feeling of exercising “choice” is
not dissimilar to that of the subjective experience of thinking or
remembering and other psychological outputs. As psychological
outputs derived from underlying cognitive systems are ultimately
dependent on brain processes, first person awareness is not privy
to how these feelings or psychological outputs are generated, and
only become aware of them when they are expressed or “come to
mind” with the feeling that we choose.
Bignetti (2014) provides a helful analysis of this persistent
and deep-rooted subjective belief as it relates to free will. A
“voluntary” action is performed by a neurocognitive system
which always precedes the experienced activity. Unaware of
the temporal lag and non-conscious processing that precedes
such subjective awareness; we as subjects erroneously believe
that we freely decide the action – which satisfies and
confirms the psychological need for the sense of agency and
personal responsibility.
While the subjective experience of free will ultimately depends
on the selective involvement of underlying neural processes and
their cognitive instantiation, it is often assumed that subjective
awareness has the functional capacity to exercise free will despite
that fact that research has shown that people can interpret
randomness in their own and others’ behavior as owing to free
choice (Ebert and Wegner, 2011).
Recognizing that most legal and political systems take the
causal efficacy of conscious mental states for granted, we argue
that belief in free will and personal responsibility evolved as
protective social constructs (Halligan and Oakley, 2015) not
dissimilar from the way our brain creates subjective awareness
of body ownership, sustains our key body processes (such as
respiration, blood circulation, digestion etc.) and also generates
outputs from our dedicated psychological processes (attention,
memories, colors, shapes, calculations, speech).
In our account (Oakley and Halligan, 2017) the social
constructs of free-will, choice, and personal accountability, are
not dispensed with—but are assumed to be embedded in non-
conscious brain systems where their existence as near universal
constructs serving powerful social purposes are maintained
through cultural broadcasting impacting via individual nervous
systems on personal narratives.
THE NATURAL PRIMACY OF
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSES
Our non-conscious centric account of consciousness critically
builds on the work of Bargh and Chartrand (1999), Bargh
and Williams (2006) and Bargh (2008) who have long argued
that much of contemporary psychology’s intuitive assumption
regarding the primacy of consciousness is wrong-headed and that
the study of psychology needs to keep in mind, that in nature, the
“unconscious mind” tends to be the rule and not the exception.
Bargh (2008) argues that despite the fact that “the history of social
psychology, and especially its subfield of social cognition, is replete
with surprising findings of complex judgmental and behavioral
phenomena that operate outside of conscious awareness and even
intention (Wegner and Bargh, 1998). . . . the surprising nature of
these findings comes no longer from their relative infrequency,..but
from the continuing overarching assumption of the field regarding
the primacy of conscious will” (p. 128).
Bargh (2008) suggests that this assumption arises from our
own subjective experience whereby “the early process models of
each new phenomenon tend to start with the assumption of a
major role played by conscious choice and decisions, intention and
awareness, in producing the phenomenon in question” (p. 128).
Bargh (2008) also reminds us that “before there was
consciousness, there already were all the unconscious modules
and components that evolved to serve adaptive ends—selective
sensitivity to the important and dangerous aspects of the
environment. . . basic motivations to survive, eat, reproduce, to
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avoid what was known to be bad for us and to approach that which
was good for us” (p. 144)
This perspective is also captured by the philosopher Jackson
(1996). “ . . .we can explain the way plants non-accidentally orient
themselves toward the sun in terms of how their internal states
get appropriately modified by the direction of the sun’s rays on
the plant before the corresponding movement. When we open up
the plant, we find the state that does the work, and also find how
it is sensitive to the sun’s direction in such a way that the plant
orients itself appropriately toward the sun. It would be a mistake
for philosophers to write to biologists telling them that the internal
states that they cite in their texts cannot, as a matter of principle,
explain the relational nature of the movements of plants. The same
goes for philosophers writing to animal biologists – and we are
animals” (p. 391–392).
Similarly, Dennett (1991, p. 251) noted, “in biology, we have
learned to resist the temptation to explain design in organisms by
positing a single great Intelligence that does all the work.... We must
build up the same resistance to the temptation to explain action as
arising from the imperatives of an internal action-orderer who does
too much of the specification work.”
Since non-conscious brain systems carry out a myriad of
complex core biological processes effortlessly and efficiently,
non-conscious causation provides a more plausible (albeit
non-intuitive) account to explain the traditionally attributed
“contents of consciousness” and the concurrent “experience
of consciousness.”
Moreover, such an approach is consistent with the observation
that, “in the rest of the natural sciences, especially neurobiology, the
assumption of conscious primacy is not nearly as prevalent as in
psychology. Complex and intelligent design in living things is not
assumed to be driven by conscious processes on the part of the plant
or animal, but instead by blindly adaptive processes that accrued
through natural selection” (Bargh and Morsella, 2008, p. 78).
Science is no stranger to conceptual misperceptions and new
paradigms of explanation replacing older accounts. Consider
“spontaneous generation” (the belief that life regularly arose
from the elements without first being formed through a
seed, egg, or other traditional means of reproduction) or the
previous well-accepted geo-centric model of the universe (from
Ptolemy), subsequently replaced by Copernicus’s sun-centered
astronomical model (the heliocentric account) effectively
removing Earth from the center of the then known universe.
Neuroscience examples include the nature of neglect, phantom
limbs and the experience of pain (Melzack and Wall, 1965).
The development of cognitive accounts of visual neglect
was delayed by the longstanding notion that the condition
was due and could be explained as resulting from primary
sensory disorders. Before visual neglect became more
commonly appreciated in behavioral neurology and cognitive
neuropsychology as an attentional/representational disorder, the
condition was often interpreted as a subset of clinical behaviors
not explicitly distinguished from those attributed to unilateral
sensory disturbances (Bender, 1952; Battersby et al., 1956;
Eidelberg and Schwartz, 1971; Weinstein and Friedman, 1977).
As Cohen (1993, p. 194) noted:“Many neurologists prior to 1950
did not distinguish disorders of neglect from other unilateral sensory
disturbances. The neglect of one side of the body or environment
that some patients with contralateral brain lesions exhibited was
considered to result from deafferentation of sensory pathways and
or sensory cortex. This position was supported by the high incidence
of primary sensory disturbances in these patients. . . therefore the
unilateral quality of neglect seems to fit with the unilateral nature
of the many sensory disturbances, in which the ascending sensory
pathways are disturbed unilaterally.”
It was only after a growing number of patients with lateralized
neurological symptoms failed to show evidence of “primary
deficits” using conventional neuro-optometry and neurological
methods that neuropsychologists in the 1970s began to more
confidently assert that VSN was a “higher-level disorder” that
could not be attributed to the effects of “primary deficits”
(Halligan and Marshall, 2002).
The experience of phantom limb following amputation in
another example. This was long considered as counter-intuitive
and anomalous (see Melzack, 1992; Halligan, 2002), which had
been explained for some time as the product of amiraculous form
of limb restoration before the 19th Century, thereby avoiding the
necessity to challenge the compelling folk account that it was
not possible to feel a body part that was no longer physically
present. A source of this misconception according to Melzack
(Melzack, 1992; Saadah and Melzack, 1994) was the assumed
primacy of sensory feedback and a passive brain, arguing instead
that “Sensory inputs merely modulate that experience; they do not
directly cause it” and that “Phantoms become comprehensible once
we recognize that the brain generates the experience of the body.”
In the field of visual perception, the investigation of “source-
monitoring” by Kunzendorf (2020) provides a good example of
the illusory nature of perceptual processes commonly attributed
to consciousness. In these studies, participants viewed a picture
or printed word on one side of their fixation point while
visually imagining the same word or picture on the other side.
They then rated the vividness of their self-generated image
compared to the physical image and were requested to indicate
which of the two images was their own creation. Surprisingly
participants’ ability to identify the imagined stimulus increased
as their subjective rating of the vividness of the imagined image
approached that of the actual stimulus. This indicated that their
response was not based on a subjective perceptual difference
between the two images, but as suggested by Kunzendorf
(2020) on an internal, non-conscious, process of monitoring the
biological source of the two images. Perception of the “real,”
physical object being based on peripheral information from
appropriate sensory systems, whereas imagined images relied on
memorial brain activity stemming primarily from higher cortical
centers. The experimental result is consistent with the view that
“non-conscious” brain processes actively monitor “sources” of
the information processing activity underlying the perceived
image and rely on evidence from increased corticofugal activity
to identify and hence distinguish the imagined, self-created
image. Interestingly, the reverse pattern was seen with hypnotic
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suggestion, as well as in cases of the psychosis and dissociation-
prone participants – whereby the individual’s capacity for source-
monitoring was explained as impaired and hence giving rise to a
reduced ability to distinguish real from self-generated images.
To better align psychology as a science with the rest of the
natural sciences, we should “begin with the assumption of
mainly unconscious instead of conscious causation of action and
phenomenal experience” (Bargh, 2008; p. 148).
RELOCATING THE CENTRAL ROLE
PLAYED BY NON-CONSCIOUS BRAIN
SYSTEMS
According to Bargh and Morsella (2008), the long standing
intuitive conscious-centric account began to be challenged
in the 1800s, following “two very different developments—
hypnotism and evolutionary theory”—both of which
indicated the “possibility of unconscious, unintended causes
for human behavior.”
Kihlstrom (1995) suggested that the German philosopher
Eduard von Hartmann’s published work, Philosophy of the
Unconscious in 1869, was largely responsible for popularizing the
concept of the unconscious, and that the notion of unconscious
was in many ways superior to consciousness.
According to Hartmann “. . . if in man we consider the sphere
belonging both to the unconscious and also to consciousness, this
much is certain, that everything which any consciousness has
the power to accomplish can be executed equally well by the
Unconscious, and that too always far more strikingly, and therewith
far more quickly and more conveniently for the individual,
since the conscious performance must be striven for, whereas
the Unconscious comes of itself and without effort” (Hartmann,
1868/1931 Vol. 2, p. 39)
Although initially criticized by William James and Hermann
Ebbinghaus, Von Hartman’s Philosophy of the Unconscious was
widely read and with translations from German into French and
English helped to make the idea of the unconscious both familiar
and more acceptable (Kihlstrom, 1995).
At the close of the 19th century, the French neurologist
Jean-Martin Charcot proposed the idea that unconscious brain
processes were responsible for the unexplained neurological
symptoms of hysteria and the pseudo-neurological behaviors
commonly produced by hypnosis (Oakley, 1999b). Central
to Charcot’s explanation was the concept that symptoms
could derive from unconscious “fixed” ideas based on
suggestions or autosuggestions “remaining isolated from the
rest of the mind and expressing themselves outwardly through
corresponding motor phenomena” (quoted from Ellenberger,
1971 in Halligan, 2011).
Also, toward the end of the 19th century, the early
pioneers of experimental psychology, Wundt, Titchener
and Helmholtz, similarly recognized that areas of mental
life, for which consciousness was claimed, were in fact
the product of prior levels of non-conscious processing.
Helmholtz (1924) regarded “unconscious processes” as
“the stuff of which conscious experience is made” and
where “conscious perceptions are determined by unconscious
inferences mental computations of which we can never be
aware, and over which we have no control” (Kihlstrom,
1995).
This idea was elaborated further and popularized in Sigmund
Freud’s psychodynamic theories in the 1920s, highlighting the
potential and neglected powerful role that unconscious processes
play in shaping human awareness and controlling everyday
behavior (Oakley, 2012).
Unfortunately, however, “just when the concept of the psychological
unconscious was getting up steam, the behaviorist revolution hit-
and the psychological unconscious went the way of consciousness
itself. It was bad enough to explain behavior in terms of mental
states that could not be publicly observed; and so, it was doubly bad
to explain behavior in terms of mental states that could not even be
privately observed!” (Kihlstrom, 1995).
THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS
As a formal area of cognitive enquiry, the study of consciousness
remained largely neglected throughout most of the 20th
century (Crick and Koch, 1990), despite renewed interest in
the 1960s by a number of pioneers of the cognitive psychology
revolution detailing informational-processing accounts of
the key psychological processes of memory, perception and
language comprehension.
The position was well captured by George Miller, one of the
founders of cognitive psychology, who in 1962 pointed out that
when one recalls something from memory “consciousness gives
no clue as to where the answer comes from; the processes that
produce it are unconscious. It is the result of thinking, not the
process of thinking, that appears spontaneously in consciousness.”
Chomsky (1980) later argued that language processing was
largely performed by a set of structures and processes whose
operation was completely inaccessible to consciousness (See
Kihlstrom, 1995) and even later by Fodor (1983) who extended
this notion by invoking cognitively impenetrable modules for
designated domains such as visual perception.
However, it was Kihlstrom’s seminal 1987 paper (and later
work, Kihlstrom, 1996) that really highlighted the role and
significance of unconscious, automatic psychological processes
in perception, memory, and action and making it clear that
“conscious awareness.. is not necessary for complex psychological
functioning” (p. 1450).
Around the same time, confirmatory research from social
psychology received attention in the form of the much-cited
paper by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) “Telling more than we can
know: Verbal reports on mental processes.” This argued that
we are only consciously aware of the products of our mental
processes and have little or no conscious awareness of the
processes themselves.
The eventual realization that so many aspects of mental life
represent products of prior levels of “unconscious” processing
continues to provide one of the reasons for the existence of
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a cognitive psychology in the first place. As Velmans (2000)
points out:
“if the complex processes which enable us to select information,
attend to it, plan, organize, determine priorities, respond
appropriately and so on, were available to consciousness, there
would be no need for careful experiment and theoretical inference
to determine their operations” (p. 68).
Despite growing evidence for an increasingly large, sophisticated
and competent non-conscious system, for many researchers,
consciousness remained relevant for explaining many agency
aspects of mental life, and it was not regarded as “an
epiphenomenon . . . or passive correlate of brain processes, but
rather an active integral part of the cerebral process itself, exerting
potent causal effects in the interplay of cerebral operations”
(Sperry, 1977).
However, for others striving to accommodate the growing
challenges from cognitive neuropsychology, introspection and
neuroscience, a more nuanced, position began to be adopted.
This ranged from a position where “most human behaviors,
especially most meaningful actions are the result of both conscious
and unconscious processes, both of which are neurologically
represented in the brain” (Baumeister et al., 2011, 2018) to
those like Bargh and Williams (2006) and Hassin (2013) who
argued that unconscious processes can carry out almost every
fundamental high-level function that conscious processes can
perform and that the role of conscious is “if not utterly zero, at
least quite miminal and peripheral” (Baumeister et al., 2018).
The 1960s witnessed renewed emphasis on informational
processing accounts for memory, perception and language
comprehension, however the cognitive enquiry into
consciousness remained largely neglected (Marcel and Bisiach,
1988). It was “the norm for accounts of personal experience to
be used only informally” (Shallice, 1988) and “...most theories
of cognition make no call at all upon consciousness” (Marcel,
1988). Neither Shallice’s (1988) nor Johnson-Laird’s (1983)
formal cognitive models implied “a definitive causal role for
consciousness” (Bisiach, 1988).
Higher-order theories of consciousness such as Rosenthal
(2008), suggest that mental states are only conscious, when and
if one is aware of being in such a mental state. These higher order
thoughts were distinguished by being reportable and recognized
as belonging to us. Rosenthal avoided epiphenomenalism
however by arguing that while consciousness of such intentional
states lack significant function, this did not “imply that the
consciousness of these states has no causal impact on other
psychological processes” but rather that the “impact is simply too
varied and insignificant to yield stable beneficial effects” (p. 831).
Studies from Libet et al. (1982) and later others (Soon et al.,
2008; Rigoni et al., 2013) suggested that the intention to act
always occurred later than preparatory brain activity (readiness
potentials) in motor systems of the brain. This was taken as
demonstrating that awareness of the decision to move and
preparation of that movement was produced by previous non-
conscious processes. As Gray (2004) concluded the experience
experience of conscious intention comes too late to be the
proximal initiator of the motor act, although sufficiently close in
time to provide support for the intuitive causal account. Evidence
from Haggard and Eimer (1999) showed that timing of the
readiness potential and experience of the intention to move was
non-linear, suggesting the two were largely independent.
By the 1990’s, there was a growing number of neuroscientists
and psychologists questioning the assumed role that
consciousness played in our mental life (Velmans, 1991;
Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Hassin et al., 2005 for a detailed
review see Earl, 2014). These included Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Gray, 2004; Hassin et al., 2005; Eagleman, 2011; Hassin,
2013; Morsella et al., 2016).
CHALLENGING THE
CONSCIOUSNESS-CENTRIC POSITION
Over the past 30 years, several converging lines of psychological
and neuropsychological enquiry have questioned the assumed
agency and functional role attributed to the experience of
consciousness (or subjective awareness). Central to this challenge
is the description of a number of dissociations demonstrating
intact or residual cognitive abilities, despite subject’s manifest
lack of awareness, as in the case of patients, with neglect, dyslexia,
blindsight, implicit memories, prosopagnosia, hypnosis, (Oakley,
1999a) and conversion hysteria (Halligan and Marshall, 1997).
In 1974, Weiskrantz described the phenomenon of
“blindsight” (Sanders et al., 1974) where patients’ actions
appear to be guided by sensory information that they were
unaware of, challenging the belief that perceptions must enter
“conscious awareness” to affect or produce our actions. Similarly
in striking cases of visual neglect, patients showed impressive
non-conscious processing for stimuli on the neglected side of
their visual fields, including object identification despite lack of
reported visual awareness (Marshall and Halligan, 1988; Driver
and Mattingley, 1998).
So why the long standing and persisting belief that subjective
awareness comprises a cognitive agentive internal action-orderer
with the capacity to make decisions and control actions and the
awareness of psychological states such as thoughts, attention,
perception, intentions, memories, etc?
Graziano’s attention schema theory (2017) provides a possible
explanation for this intractable belief in the form of an
attention data-handling method employed by the brain to ration
processing resources. According to this theory, the experience
of consciousness arises from the brain’s own feedback when
monitoring attention. In the same way that the brain constructs a
“body schema” that models interactions from touch, vision, and
proprioceptive information to build a virtual model of a phantom
body (see Halligan, 2002), Graziano suggests that the brain
employs an analogous “attention schema,” that provides our
cognitive processes with a high level (albeit imperfect) overview
of where attention is distributed and where consciousness is
“phantom’s attention” (Graziano, 2016b).
According to Graziano et al. (2019) “the belief in a non-
materialistic component to the mind—is a lingering fragment of a
larger cluster of incorrect culturally widespread, folk-psychological
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beliefs. . . .that derive from implicit, social-cognitive models, that
have infiltrated the science of consciousness’ perpetuating mistaken
assumptions” (p. 3).
Evidence from cognitive development also suggests that
such intuitive pre-instructional beliefs feature in many areas of
science and often coexist potentially delaying or obstructing the
acceptance of scientific accounts (Shtulman and Valcarcel, 2012;
Shtulman and Harrington, 2016).
According to Shtulman and Harrington (2016) this conflict
where participants continue to hold on to intuitive theories
persists across the lifespan and can influence scientific reasoning
for decades beyond the acquisition of a mutually incompatible
scientific theory.
“For instance, students charged with learning a kinetic theory of
heat must un-learn a substance-based theory in which heat is
construed as an immaterial substance that flows in and out of
objects and can be trapped or contained (Reiner et al., 2000).
Students charged with learning a selection-based theory of evolution
must unlearna need-based theory in which evolution is construed as
a process that guarantees organisms the traits they need in order to
survive (Shtulman and Harrington, 2016). And students charged
with learning an inertial theory of mechanics must un-learn an
“impetus” -based theory in which objects are assumed to move only
if imparted an internal force, or impetus, andwill remain in motion
until that impetus dissipates (McCloskey et al., 1983)” (p. 119)
“These intuitive accounts are actively reinforced by how we
talk about natural phenomena in everyday discourse and how
we perceive natural phenomena in everyday situations. . . Research
has shown that adults exhibit cognitive conflict when retrieving
scientific information that contradicts the intuitive theories they
had presumably abandoned as children” (p. 132).
One explanation for why intuitive theories seem to persist
across the lifespan is that they may be represented in the brain
in a cognitively impenetrable format, similar to the seemingly
impenetrable representations of language (Coltheart, 1999) and
vision (Pylyshyn, 1999). In vision, for instance, we can be
well aware that our eyes deceive us when viewing the Muller-
Lyer illusion or the Ponzo illusion, but we perceive the illusion
nonetheless (p. 132).
Much of our colloquial language predicates these persisting
intuitive conceptions:
The terms “sunrise” and “sunset,” for instance, imply that day and
night are caused by movements of the sun rather thanmovements of
the earth. More accurate terms would be “sun accretion” and “sun
occlusion.” Likewise, the terms “warm coat” and “cold wind” imply
that heat is an intrinsic property of objects rather than something
that is transferred across physical systems. More accurate terms
would be “insulating coat” and “disequilibrating wind.” (Shtulman
and Harrington, 2016, p. 133)
Arguing that subjective awareness (consciousness) and mental
phenomena are a direct consequence of neural process, clearly
speaks against the commonly held intuitive dualist accounts
where consciousness is perceived as a critical contributor when
explaining human psychology.
Research from developmental psychology suggests that while
the precise formulation of such beliefs are culturally determined,
“the idea that consciousness is different from the body is universal.”
Eagleman (2011).
Using survey evidence where the majority of respondents
considered the mind was not purely a physical entity, Demertzi
et al. (2009) suggest that belief in dualism is widespread and
continues to exert an influence on scientific thought, whereas
“cognitive neuroscience reflects a sustained attempt by scientists
to re-instate mind within nature, from which it was exiled by
Descartes at the inception of modern science”(p. 8).
According to Webb and Graziano (2015), the internal read
out from the attentional schema is “the brain’s way of rationing
its processing resources,” that leads the brain to conclude that it
has a subjective experience. Hence, according Graziano (2016a)
“the human brain insists it has consciousness, with all the
phenomenological mystery, because it constructs information to
that effect.”
Unlike Graziano (2013), who considers consciousness as
playing “an active role in guiding our behavior,” we consider
subjective awareness to be epiphenomenal, in much the same
way that the redness of blood is a consequence of the biological
mechanism required to deliver oxygen, but not a function in its
own right.
In adopting this epiphenomenalist explanation for the
experience of awareness, we propose (Halligan and Oakley, 2015,
2018; Oakley and Halligan, 2017) that the functional capacities
commonly attributed to it are generated non-consciously by
cognitive processes from a neurally instantiated central executive
system. As such, we consider subjective experience (“personal
awareness” in our model) to be a passive, accompaniment to a
non-agentive personal narrative, created by the selective “internal
broadcasting” of task-related outputs from non-conscious neural
executive systems that have access to cognitive processing,
sensory information, and motor control.
Consequently as “subjects of unconscious authoring” (Meese,
2018), our account makes no reference to consciousness as
an agentive controller – rather we propose that this subjective
personal awareness is a passive accompaniment to the task-
relevant cognitive events that form our “personal narrative”
and exerts no causal or controlling relationship over any
psychological processes or contents.
Our account questions the strong notion of a binary
distinction between conscious and non-conscious mental
systems and suggests the need to reframe the traditional
qualitative distinction in favor of a continuum of non-conscious
processes (Halligan and Oakley, 2018).
REVISTING EPIPHENOMENALISM
The conceptual foundations of our account have existed since at
least the 19th century and can be characterized as epiphenomenal
property dualism, a counter-intuitive philosophical position that
considers the world as comprising one physical substance (e.g.,
body/brains) but having two fundamentally different properties,
mental and physical, and where mental phenomena are solely
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generated (caused) by the physical substance (i.e., where mental
properties are “causally redundant”).
Accepting this property dualism, all mental states (our
thoughts and feelings, and sense of self) are generated by
electrochemical brain activity and remain dependent on such
brain states. Without a brain or relevant brain states there are no
mental states.
Although we readily accept the first-person reality of personal
experience, we aver a uni-directional causal relationship, whereby
neurological states (somehow) generate mental states, but that
these mental states (derived from physical states) that we become
aware of, do not have the capacity to influence physical or mental
states. As Robinson (2010) points out “the less we feel we can
rely on our intuitions in this area, the more seriously the claims
of epiphenomenalism have to be investigated.”
The neurocognitive states that provide for mental states have
a direct effect on both the experience (i.e., subjective awareness)
and the contents of that awareness (feelings, thoughts, agency,
self, etc.).
Neuroscience has yet to explain how subjective
awareness is generated by brain systems. However, there is
compelling evidence from everyday observation, neurology,
neurophysiology and cognitive sciences that demonstrate that
the existence and proper functioning of subjective awareness and
associated psychological processes is causally dependent on the
intactness and interplay of different brain regions.
The current explanatory gap (how neural systems generate
mental states) does not of itself provide grounds in the belief
that mental processes can direct psychological and corporeal
systems. Whatever subjective awareness is – it has nonetheless
to be fundamentally linked to physiological alterations in the
central nervous system. All mental operations require the
temporal precedence of physiological processes before outputs
are experienced in conscious awareness. There is no evidence
that mental states can exist or are capable of being experienced
without functioning brain systems.
To help counter the apparent absurdity of the
epiphenomenologist position when applied to the perceived
exercise of conscious will, Wegner developed a theory of
Apparent Mental Causation (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999)
which argued that “people experience conscious will when they
interpret their own thought as the cause of their action.” According
to the theory, “when a thought appears in consciousness just prior
to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive
of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious
will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action” Wegner
(2004, p. 1). In other words, the experience of conscious thoughts
and actions are produced in parallel—and both are generated by
unconscious neural events.
According to Wegner’s theory, when we make voluntary
actions, there is an unconscious causal motor pathway responsible
for the action. This pathway corresponds to the workings of the
motor control system. In addition, there is also an unconscious
causal pathway responsible for the associated thoughts about the
actions (i.e., a link back to our intentions). According to Wegner
and Wheatley (1999) it is the relationship between the thought
and the action that produces the sense of agency (or in Wegner’s
term, the “experience of conscious will”). When the intention to
act happens before we act, and is consistent with the action, and
is the only plausible cause of the action, then we feel as though we
have caused the action.
In support of this view, Wegner cites evidence from “clinical
disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity
disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations” and non-
clinical case examples including phenomena from “hypnosis,
automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated
communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance
channeling” (Wegner, 2004, p. 1).
Wegner also cites the pioneering studies of Penfield - one of
the first neuroscientists to experimentally map basic sensory and
motor areas during brain surgery while patients were conscious
and showed how selective brain stimulation could cause a
person’s hand to move without their experience of volition.
According to Wegner (2002) the evidence that brain
stimulation could produce voluntary-appearing actions without
the actions performed being felt as consciously willed.. . . suggests
that the brain structures that provides the experience of will
is separate from the brain source of action. It appears possible
to produce voluntary action through brain stimulation with or
without an experience of conscious will. This, in turn, suggests
the interesting possibility that conscious will is an add-on, an
experience that has its own origins and consequences. . . only loosely
coupled with the mechanisms that yield action itself (Wegner,
2002: 47).
The strongly held intuitive belief in an agentive subjective
awareness capable of generating and/or influencing psychological
states is seen as originating from brain systems which are
ultimately responsible for both generating the contents of our
psychological states and the experience of subjective awareness.
Adopting the epiphenomenalist stance, the experience of
consciousness (subjective awareness) is a product of unconscious
brain processes. The compelling belief in its causal subjective
abilities arises (not unreasonably) from the close association
whereby mental events – are temporally associated –and
are therefore perceived to produce the behaviors or actions
that follow.
An early version of epiphenomenalism articulated by the biologist
Huxley (1874) noted that “All states of consciousness in us,[. . . ], are
immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance. It
seems to me that in men (sic), as in brutes there is no proof that any
state of consciousness is [itself] the cause of change in the motion of
the matter [brain] of the organism.”
The philosopher David Chalmers (1996) points out, that as
the epiphenomenalist position is strongly counter-intuitive as an
explanation for everyday lived experience it is not surprising that
it has few friends (Jackson, 1982; Baysan, 2020), and has been
deemed “a disgrace. . . more awful than dualism” (Honderich,
2001, p. 247, 278); “a dreaded relic of pre-scientific philosophy”
(Dennett, 1998) “thoughtless and incoherent” (Taylor, 1927, 198),
“unintelligible” (Benecke, 1901, 26), “quite impossible to believe”
(Taylor, 1963, 28) and “truly incredible” (McLaughlin, 1994, 284).
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On the other hand, “the vigor of the opposition to it, however, is
a backhanded recognition that there are substantial considerations
that at least appear to support it” (Robinson, 2010).
Many findings of “science are typically counter-intuitive
and probabilistic” (Dela Sala, 1999) and “novelty emerges only
with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background
provided by expectation” (Kuhn, 1970). The astronomer Nicolas
Copernicus (1473–1543) published his book in 1543 challenging
the established geocentric model of the universe, a position
that lay at the heart of the Aristotelian and religious worldview
and remained unchallenged for centuries. In 1616, the Catholic
Church issued a prohibition against the Copernican theory of
the earth’s motion, and this resurfaced at the Inquisition trial and
condemnation of Galileo Galilei in 1633.
According to Lane and Harris (2014) “. . . children and adults
believe in a variety of entities and processes that defy and overcome
intuitive conceptions and first-hand perceptions of the world.
These include scientific concepts of invisible germs and oxygen,
heliocentrism, and a spherical Earth, as well as religious concepts
of deities who are all-knowing and all-powerful, Heaven, and souls
that continue to exist even after the mind and body have died.”
Epiphenomenalism is not a natural, intuitive explanation and
is incompatible with our own first-hand personal experience.
However, Baggini (2005) in his fictious “Land of the Epiphens”
provides a helpful story that captures both our “naturalistic”
or default thinking (Hassin, 2013), while also highlighting the
challenge of confusing correlation with causation.
Baggini’s (2005) allegory (quoted below) illustrates the way in
which inhabitants of Epiphenia and humans might interact on
the subject with the key difference however being that “epiphens”
believe that thoughts do not serve as causes:
“Epiphenia was a remarkable planet. So like the Earth in
appearance, and yet its inhabitants were different in one
remarkable way.”
As one of them, Huxley, explained to the visiting Earthling Dirk,
the Epiphens had long ago “discovered” that their thoughts did not
affect their actions. Thoughts were the effects of bodily processes, not
the other way around. Dirk found this baffling.
‘’You can’t really believe this,” he protested to Huxley. “For
instance, when we met in this bar, you said, “Gee, I could kill for
a beer,” and ordered one. Are you saying that the thought “I want a
beer,” had no effect on your actions?”
“Of course it didn’t,” replied Huxley, as though the question were
idiotic. “We have thoughts and these often precede actions. But we
know full well that these thoughts aren’t causing the actions. My
body and brain were already gearing up to order a beer. The thought
“I could kill for a beer” was just something that popped into my head
as a result of what was happening in the physical brain and body.
Thoughts don’t cause actions.”
“For Epiphens, maybe,” replied Dirk.
“Well I can’t see what’s different about humans,” said Huxley,
and for a while at least, nor could Dirk.
(Baggini, J., The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten, 2005, p. 61.)
According to Baggini (2005) this fictional land of Epiphenia
challenges the idea that no one can live with epiphenomenalism
and where the crucial point is that “how it feels to be an Epiphen
is exactly the same as what feels like to be a human being. In both
cases, thought accompanies action in just the same way. The only
difference is that Epiphens do not believe their thoughts are doing
any causing” (p. 62).
While the compelling and self-evident explanation of the
conscious-centric account does not undermine the logic of
the epiphenomenalism argument, it is worth considering the
epiphenomenalist’s explanation for some everyday experiences.
When we experience pain for example, few consider that
the excruciating hurt experienced is in fact a subjective
representation generated by a biologically controlled, automatic
protective hardwired system designed to signal corporeal damage
or dysfunction with a view to encouraging protective/avoidance
behaviors. Furthermore, most accept that the brain systems that
generate the distinctive felt experience of pain can also provide
sufficient cause for the range of related mental and behavioral
responses to that pain (e.g., crying, complaining, protecting the
damaged body part). Accordingly, a consistent epiphenomenal
view of pain would regard the neural brain processes as providing
both the sufficient cause for both the mental state (i.e., felt painful
experience) and associated behaviors previously attributed to the
phenomenal state, whereas the psychological experience of the
pain, while all too real, doesn’t of itself cause anything.
Consequently, while both the phenomenal experience and the
associated behaviors have underlying neural origins, their close
temporal association supports a causal inference that persuades
us that it was the feeling/experience that resulted in the behavior.
In other words, the experience of what it is like to be in pain is
not “something” with causal properties, but rather it is something
generated by the brain and not a property of the experience
per se. This is also true for other emotions- fear, anger, sadness,
happiness, surprise, disgust, etc.
Likewise, when we verbalize what we are aware of when we
think, the default inference is that what we say (the outputs) are
caused by what we think. But an epiphenomenalist could equally
argue that the thought and the verbalisations are both generated
by underlying neural processes.
Consider another example by Baggini (2005) who explores
the intuitive premise that appears to confirm the role of
consciousness as the agent that lies behind the experience
of thinking.
“Let’s say you’re trying to work out a solution to a tricky logical
or mathematical problem. Eventually, the eureka moment comes.
In this case, surely the actual thinking has to play a part in the
explanation for your actions?
Well, no. Why can’t I believe that the conscious experience of
thinking is just a by-product of the computing that is going on at
brain level? It may be the necessary byproduct. But just as the noise
that a boiling pot of water makes is an inevitable byproduct of the
heating without that meaning it is the noise which cooks the egg, so
thought could be the necessary by product of neural computation
that doesn’t itself produce the solution to the problem.
Indeed, if you think about thinking, there does seem to be
something almost involuntary about it. Solutions “come to us”, for
example, not we to them. Reflect on what it really feels like to think,
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and the idea that it is a byproduct of a process you are not conscious
of may not seem quite so fanciful” (p. 62).
The epiphenomenalist position does not deny subjective reality,
but rather questions the natural, post-hoc causal inference linking
thought and action. As argued in Halligan and Oakley (2018),
the compelling evidence for the conscious centric account largely
stems from the close and repeated temporal continuity of
thoughts and actions (Blakemore et al., 2001; Woods et al., 2014).
Given that “humans are causal determinists...” [we] “cannot
help but experience the world as a continuous sequence of
events and outcomes” (Hood, 2006). All our actions however
have physical causes (i.e., neurophysiological changes in the
brain), and therefore our intention, desire or volition to act,
however intuitively compelling does not necessarily cause these
very thoughts or related actions but rather are themselves caused
by the physical brain processes that precede these thoughts
and actions.
SUMMARY
We experience and explain ourselves at the level of our thoughts,
decisions, and intentions. This self-evident (insider) view of
consciousness with the executive agency to control our actions
and psychological contents provides a compelling first person
account that continues to shape scientific accounts of psychology
and human behavior.
The distinction between first person (personal level) and
third person (sub-personal levels) explanations for consciousness
(originally described by Dennett (1969), offers two different
explanatory frameworks of human behavior. Both provide
different perspectives for how psychological processes are
arranged. The primacy of the personal perspective inevitably
influenced subsequent sub-personal accounts, ultimately fueling
longstanding implicit dualism and support for conscious centric
function and a functional distinction between conscious and
non-conscious processes.
While we consider the intuitive explanation of consciousness
to be a compelling social construct as real as free will, money,
and equality, we suggest that the traditional conceptualization
as an agentive consciousness is not supported by cognitive
neuroscience and reflective introspections. Our account does not
attempt to explain how the experience of being aware and mental
states are generated by the brain, but rather seeks, in providing
a scientific framework of our human psychology to dislodge
the intuitive first person perspective of executive agency to that
of a 3rd person perspective, where consciousness is regarded
as an inert passive “personal narrative” that accompanies
brain processes.
Although our ability to verbally report our subjective
experiences will always remain an important variable as a
readout of prior neurocognitive processes our account assumes
no absolute, qualitative difference between conscious and non-
conscious processing, preferring to see the traditional distinction
between “automatic” and “controlled” cognitive processes as
representing a qualitative indicator located along a continuum of
neurocognitive awareness.
As noted previously, we consider the Personal Narrative (PN)
to be, the product of non-conscious neurocognitive activity
located in the Central Executive Structure internally broadcasting
selective processes and cognitive products related to the “task
in hand”.
The adaptive evolutionary advantage of the PN resides
in the capacity for a selection of psychological contents to
be communicated to others via language, gestures, physical
artfacts, etc. - contributing ultimately to the evolution of cultural
resources. The content of the PN is also selectively transferred to
episodic memory as a resource.
Although epiphenomenalism will always remain, personally
and emotionally a deeply unsatisfying position this conceptual
repositioning provides a framework that relocates non-conscious
neurocognitive processes to the center of any scientific endeavor
to explain how the human brain is psychologically organized (the
machinery) rather than focusing on the subjective experience
(the ghost).
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